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WORKING PAPER
ALFRED P. SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

REVITALIZING LARGE COMPANIES

David G. Anderson Julien R. Phillips

Sloan School of Management McKinsey & Company

Massachusetts Institute of Technology San Francisco, CA

SSM WP // 1680-85

Nancy Kaible
Concord, Massachusetts

July, 1935

MASSACHUSETTS

INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

50 MEMORIAL DRIVE

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139

REVITALIZING LARGE COMPANIES

David G. Anderson Julien R. Phillips

Sloan School of Management McKinsey & Company

Massachusetts Institute of Technology San Francisco, CA

Nancy Kaible
Concord, Massachusetts
SSM UP // 1680-85 July, 1985

REVITALIZING LARGE COMPANIES

by

David G. Anderson
Assistant Professor of Management
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Julien R. Phillips
Principal, McKinsey & Company, Inc
San Francisco, California

Nancy Kaible
Concord, Massachusetts

July, 1985

Note : Do not copy or cite this article without the written consent of the
authors .

AUG 9 1985

- 1 -

INTRODUCTION

In these turbulent times, many large companies in Europe and America
are trying to cope with growing domestic and international competition, rapid
technological change, sudden shifts in consumer preferences, and other
changes in their business environments by making major changes in strategies,
structures, and management systems all at once. The struggles of some
corporate giants trying to transform themselves — AT&T, Ford, Kodak, Levi
Strauss, and Siemens, among others — are becoming quite well known through
frequent stories in the business press.

The track record for large companies that attempt fundamental
transformations is not too encouraging. Addressograph Multigraph's ill-fated
attempt to move from electromechanical to electronic technologies
demonstrates how difficult it can be to bridge a major technology gap.-*-
When computers and xerography began to cut sharply into Addressograph
Multigraph's traditional duplicating markets in the 1960s, management was
slow to respond. In the late 1960s, though, the company abruptly reversed
its conservative course and introduced a barrage of new products.
Unfortunately, almost all of them were unsuccessful, and Che company was
forced to write off over $30 million in discontinued equipment in the early
1970s.

Addressograph Multigraph's weakened financial condition prompted a
change of management, and Charles Davis was brought in from Honeywell in 1973
to overhaul the company's product lines and management systems. Davis's
efforts had little impact, however, and three years later Roy Ash, head of
the Office of Management and the Budget (0MB) under President Nixon and
co-founder of Litton Industries, was named CEO. Ash tried to use

- 2

Addressograph Multigraph's older product lines as "cash cows" to fund a new
thrust into electronics and the "office of the future." The company acquired
a number of small electronic firms and committed research funds to developing
large, sophisticated office automation systems. Ash also tried to rejuvenate
the company's image, changing its name to AM International and moving the
corporate headquarters from low-tech Cleveland to high-tech Los Angeles. He
spoke prominently about "changing the corporate culture" at AM International
(Kraar, 1978).

Unfortunately, in the rush to propel AM International into new markets.
Ash and his new management team neglected the company's old businesses and
mismanaged its new ones. Investment in older product lines (e.g., the small
duplicating machines that populated thousands of businesses, schools, and
other institutions, was cut off, which accelerated the deterioration of AM
International's competitive position in these core businesses. Newly
acquired companies were rushed along too fast, with inadequate attention to
product positioning, manufacturing efficiency, and financial controls. The
result of all this was further losses, and in 1981 Ash was replaced as CEO by
Richard Black, a "turnaround artist" who had saved Chicago-based Maremount
Corporation from bankruptcy in the late 1970s. Black was unable to turn AM
International around, and the company filed for protection under Chapter XI
in early 1982.

What makes change efforts like Addressograph Multigraph's so difficult
to carry out successfully is their complexity. The scope of change is not
limited to enhancing a few product lines, reducing turnover and absenteeism,
or divesting one or two poor performers. In a large multinational company,
major changes cut across many functions, product lines, and geographies. A
major transformation often changes a company's relationships with

- 3 -

shareholders, customers, bankers, and other constituencies. Fundamental
cultural characteristics, from the way employees interact with each other to
the way they treat customers and suppliers, are scrutinized and challenged.
Furthermore, because the scope of change is so broad, time horizons are long,
which complicates the task further.

Even though change has been a central issue in organizational behavior
for many years, there are relatively few descriptive theories of the change
process, and even fewer thiat are specifically directed at the process of
transformation in large organizations.^ For the most part, descriptive
studies of large-scale organizational transformations have been left to
historians, biographers, and journalists, whose objectives have been to
chronicle individual cases, not develop general theories. Detailed accounts
like the autobiographies of Sloan, lacocca, and Edwardes, the careful
histories of Chandler and others, as well as much current writing in business
periodicals, raise many interesting theoretical issues about the
transformation process. However, drawing together fragmentary information
from such diverse sources into a coherent set of propositions about
large-scale change is a daunting task.

The research described here is exploratory: it describes a set of
hypotheses about one particular type of large-scale change (a

"revitalization") by studying a number of companies that managed this type of
change successfully. The study was motivated by the presumption that
managers who undertake revitalizations in their own companies can reduce
their risk of failure by learning from other companies which succeeded. In
general terms, the research aims to build "grounded theory" about the process
of major change in large organizations using an inductive comparative case
study approach. From interviews and documentary evidence, we pieced together

- 4 -

a general framework that identifies connnon themes and patterns of action
across different revitalizations , concentrating on those factors which seem
important to their success.

REVITALIZATION CASE STUDIES

A revitalization is defined as a change process that transforms an
organization from a state of stagnant or substandard performance relative to
peers in its task environment to a state of sustained superior performance in
a moderate period of time (5 or 10 years). While this definition of a
revitalization is not very precise, it captures an important process which
seems to occur periodically in large companies.^

A revitalization can be distinguished from three other types of
favorable changes in organizational performance: (1) Enhancement; (2)
Turnaround; and (3) Recovery. An organization has been enhanced if its
performance relative to peers in its industry improves gradually over a long
period of time — fifteen or twenty years or more. Enhancement is an
incremental process of strengthening the skill base of different functions
and businesses over time, and overall performance improves slowly. Since
most companies in competitive industries are prodded into improving
themselves over time, enhancement implies that a company is improving itself
faster than its competitors. Still, progress can be quite slow. In a
revitalization, by contrast, dramatic improvement in overall performance
typically takes place in five or ten years, and at the end of that time, the
company is performing very well relative to its peers.

Another type of favorable change in organizational performance is a
turnaround. A turnaround occurs when an organization regains a mediocre

- 5 -

level of performance after surviving through a critical period where its
survival is threatened. Turnarounds have generated considerable interest
lately in the wake of recent successes at Chrysler, British Leyland, and
other large companies, and the external and internal conditions required for
turnaround success have received a good deal of study in the last few
years .^

One difference between a turnaround and a revitalization relates to the
state of the organization before and after the change. Before a turnaround,
the organization is facing a serious crisis, while before a revitalization,
the organization's survival is not seriously threatened. After a turnaround,
an organization is simply surviving, while after a revitalization, the
organization has achieved superior performance relative to other companies in
its industry. One other difference is the typical time-frame of a turnaround
— usually two or three years, rather than five or ten.

The last type of favorable change is a recovery. A recovery is similar
to a revitalization, except that the period of substandard performance
directly preceding the transition is very short. In other words, a recovery
occurs when a high-performing organization stumbles through a brief period of
mediocre or poor performance but then regains its previous performance
level. Boeing's rebound from the SST cutbacks of the early 1970s is an
example of a recovery. Three to five years appears to be a typical
time-frame for a recovery.

Figure 1 shows stylized performance profiles for these four types of
favorable organizational change. The approaches and techniques required to

Insert Figure 1 about here

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manage these different types of change are likely to differ. For example,
cash management and short-term asset restructuring are probably more
important for managing turnarounds than for revitalizations or recoveries.
In the real world, however, these distinctions are often fuzzy. Since most
large companies achieved outstanding performance at some point in their
histories, the distinction between a recovery and a revitalization depends on
how long the company's problems persisted before its upturn began. Since
revitalizations as well as turnarounds are usually preceded by a period of
low performance, the distinction between these two types hinges on the
seriousness of the downturn, the speed of improvement, and the ultimate
success of the effort. To complicate things further, there are some examples
of turnarounds which evolved into full-blown revitalizations. In fact, one
of the companies studied here (ConAgra) followed this pattern. Thus, while
these four types of change can be distinguished in principle, they are likely
to show some similarities in practice.

Data Sources

The 17 revitalizations studied are shown in Table 1. This sample was

Insert Table 1 about here

compiled from various sources, including articles in academic journals,
business periodicals, interviews with company employees, consultants,
industry experts, and other knowledgeable outsiders. Each company was

REVITALIZED COMPANIES

Company
I. Extensive investigations
ConAgra
Hershey Foods

Years of
Revitalization

1975-83
1974-83

II. Interview(s) with top officer(s)

Cabot Corporation 1969-80

Dana Corporation 1969-78

Emerson Electric 1954-71

Harris Corporation 1958-78

III. Public sources
First Boston
Fokker (Holland)
Geico
K-Mart

Litton Industries
R. H. Macy
NEC (Japan)

SAS (Sweden)
Standard Oil of Indiana
Texas Commerce Bank
Toyo Kogyo (Japan)

1978-83
1977-83
1976-83
1963-72
1975-80
1974-82
1967-80

1981-???
1968-80
1967-82
1973-84

Key Players

Mike Harper

Bill Dearden
Dick Zimmerman

Bob Charpie

Ren McPherson

Buck Persons

George Dively
Dick Tullis

George Shinn

Swarttouw

Jack Byrne

Harry Cunningham

Fred O'Green

Ed Finkelstein

Kobayashi

Hattori

Ouchi

Jan Carlzon

John Swearingen

Ben Love

Murai
Yamasaki

Table 1

- 7 -

subjected to several financial screens to ensure that its performance during
the revitalization actually fit the definition given above. However, because
of the unsystematic sampling procedure used, we do not suggest that this list
is exhaustive or even representative of the population of all revitalized
companies .

The financial performance of the ten publicly held non-financial U.S.
corporations included in this study is shown in Table 2," Each company's

Insert Table 2 about here

return on total capital, sales growth rate, and extraordinary return to
stockholders (appreciation plus dividends minus the average return for the
stock market as a whole) were calculated. Percentile rankings relative to
industry peers were also estimated where this information was readily
available .

Taking all ten companies together, return on total capital during these
revitalizations increased from an average of 8.2% (the 38th percentile
relative to other companies in the same industries) to 13. A% (the 86th
percentile relative to other companies in the same industries). On average,
sales in constant dollars grew at an annual rate of 10.1% during the
revitalizations, moving these companies from the 47th to the 76th percentile
in 5-year compound sales growth relative to other companies in their
industries. Extraordinary return to stockholders averaged 1150% on an
investment made at the start and liquidated at the end of the revitalization
period, an average annual return of almost 25% per year above the market as a

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whole. Such impressive returns are usually thought possible only in
successful start-up companies. Yet, these ten companies averaged over $1
billion in sales (over $2 billion in 1983 dollars) and had been in existence
67 years on average before their revitalizations began.

Data about the process of change in these companies came from a variety
of sources: interviews with executives, managers, and Board members of
revitalized companies, annual reports, business school cases, articles in
business periodicals, autobiographies, official histories, and other
secondary sources. Table 1 classifies the companies by source of data. In
two companies (ConAgra and Hershey Foods) , extensive interviews were
conducted with most top officers and a number of middle and lower level
managers as well. Annual reports and company documents written during the
revitalization period were also reviewed. In four companies, at least one
lengthy interview was conducted with a top officer, usually the CEO at the
time of the revitalization. Here, too, annual reports and some company
documents were reviewed. In eleven companies, information about the
revitalization was obtained from public sources, principally annual reports
and articles in business periodicals.

REVITALIZATION FRAMEWORK

These 17 revitalizations are quite diverse. For instance, while Dana
Corporation improved its performance by increasing productivity in its
traditional businesses, Cabot Corporation leveraged its dominant market
position in carbon black to build fast-growing new businesses in specialty
metals and energy. Despite such differences, however, the research revealed
many common themes in the revitalization process across these companies. The

- 9 -

framework described below provides an integrative, impressionistic summary of
these common elements. Of course, because this research studied mainly
successful revitalizations , some or all of these elements may also be present
in companies which attempted revitalizations that did not succeed.

The revitalization framework is illustrated in Figure 2. It contains

Insert Figure 2 about here

four elements, all of which were present in the successful revitalizations we
studied :

- A Will to Change — a conviction within the top management group that
change is needed, and a commitment to take action based on that
conviction, even though it will shake up standard routines and may
require personal sacrifices along the way.

- A Vision of the Future — a simple, compelling view of the future —
what the company can become — that is communicated widely throughout
the company.

- Championing Leadership — people throughout the organization (at the
middle and bottom as well as at the top) who commit themselves to
pushing the revitalization forward.

- Momentum-Building Activities — a flow of demonstrably successful
decisions and actions that work to sustain and broaden the change
effort over time.

As Figure 2 indicates, in the revitalizations studied here, the first two

elements (a will to change and a vision of the future) were influenced

primarily by top management. The other two elements (championing leadership

and momentum-building activities) describe efforts taken primarily by middle

and lower level managers and non-managerial employees. Top management,

however, played a major role in stimulating, encouraging, controlling, and

diffusing these efforts. The arrows linking all four elements in Figure 2

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- 10

indicate that each element reinforced — and was reinforced by — all the
others over time. Rather than follow a clear sequence, all four elements
were visited and revisited many times as the revitalizations evolved.

wjU to Change

As trite as it may sound, the first stumbling block to revitalizing a
large company is generally a lack of will to change within its top management
group. A will to change is motivated in part by a strong felt need for
change. Sometimes, the company is in crisis, and the need for change is
obvious. ConAgra was near bankruptcy, with over $160 million in debt and
only about $30 million in equity when Mike Harper was brought in from
Pillsbury in 1974 to turn the company around. Emerson Electric had endured a
lengthy strike and faced further severe losses when Buck Persons was brought
in as CEO from Lincoln Electric in 1954. In turnaround situations like this,
the need for change is clear at the beginning.

In other situations, when the need for change is not so obvious, it
generally begins with a realization by one or two senior managers that the
external environment (customers, competitors, technologies, government
regulation, etc.) is changing, and that the company is unlikely to prosper if
it continues doing business as usual. As Rosabeth Kanter points out, it is
not environmental pressures per se. but the perceptions of those pressures
held by key managers that motivate a will to change.' For those managers
who perceive a threat, change is seen as crucial to improving the company's
performance and fulfilling the expectations of its stakeholders. This was
clearly the case at Hershey Foods Corporation. CEO Bill Dearden's will to
change was born of a concern that Hershey was "on the downward slope" and

- 11 -

needed revitalization if it was going to continue to support the Milton
Hershey School, the company's major stockholder. (Dearden grew up at the
Hershey school, which certainly strengthened his resolve to improve the
performance of the school's main asset.)

Usually, change is seen by senior managers as an opportunity as well as
a threat — a way to make more money for the company and for themselves,
too. When Mike Harper left Pillsbury to take charge of ConAgra, he saw an
opportunity to rebuild a virtually bankrupt company into a profitable,
growing enterprise once again. Bob Charpie felt this same sense of
opportunity when he left Bell & Howell to become CEO of Cabot Corporation.
Through stock ownership, both executives stood to gain personally by
improving their companies' performance, and they made sure that other
managers had the potential for long-term personal gain as well.° The will
to change is strongest when both positive and negative incentives — the
carrot and stick — work together in the same direction.

Wherever the felt need for change originates, it is rarely met with
iimnediate agreement among all top officers. And, since senior managers have
considerable power to resist new initiatives and undercut the will to change
if they are not "on board," an entire revitalization effort can be
jeopardized unless the need for change is accepted by everyone in the top
management group. In all the revitalizations we studied, conflict among
members of the top team regarding the need for change was faced head-on early
in the process. Most of the revitalizations started off with a series of
management meetings to educate top managers about the need for change and
influence them to accept its implications. Outsiders were often hired into
key positions in order to help forge new alliances, occasionally replacing
older managers who were unwilling to commit themselves to the idea that

- 12 -

change was needed. The goal of all these efforts went beyond achieving
passive agreement. Revitalization leaders tried to instill in other top
managers a deep, lasting conviction that major change was truly essential.

According to conventional wisdom, once top management has developed a
will to change, they make the strategic decisions that define the actions
required of subordinates and communicate these decisions down the line. In
fact, in the revitalized companies, the need for change itself was made
concrete and communicated widely throughout the company. Senior managers
spent many hours expanding the circle of people who accepted the need for
change and prompting them to act on their beliefs. The process resembled
recruiting followers to a new political program or attracting disciples to a
new religious movement more than implementing a new corporate strategy.

Instilling a will to change down at the roots of a large company is an
exercise in persuasive communication which depends for its success on the
salesmanship of senior managers, the sophistication of organization members,
and the degree of trust members have in management. While there are a myriad
of techniques available to help managers communicate the need for change, the
most important seems to be personal persuasion by the change leader.
McPherson of Dana, Carlzon of SAS , Harper of ConAgra, and Dearden of Hershey
all called themselves "salesmen" or "preachers." (Dearden: "I'm a salesman,
and I'm in shape, and there's no worse combination. I can go an all night!")

An important function of this communication process was creating a
sense of community or "family" throughout the company that could counter
potentially divisive in-group/out-group tensions. When Rene McPherson was
named President of Dana Corporation in 1968, he began holding "town meetings"
in Dana's plants to give employees a chance to talk directly with him about
anything they felt like. Held in warehouses between shift changes to

- 13 -

maximize access, they were completely voluntary but always well attended.
("No plant manager ever put enough chairs out.") Hundreds or even thousands
of employees would sit on folding chairs listening to McPherson speak, and
many would queue up in front of floor microphones waiting to ask him
questions as he roamed through the audience.

Outside media and press coverage were often used to communicate the
need for change and provoke debate inside the company. Dana Corporation's
use of corporate image advertisements, like one which proclaimed "Talk Back
to the Boss" in large block letters, helped communicate top management's
commitment to building a more democratic workplace to workers (and their
bosses). Press reports and other forms of outside publicity can be very
effective in reinforcing employees' felt need for change.'

Rational arguments and persuasive presentations, while important, don't
work with everyone. In any large company, there are influential doubters at
many levels whose resistance must be neutralized if they cannot be convinced
of the need for change. One source of resistance arises from the vested
interests of key individuals and groups that cause them to defend the status
quo. Early in Dana's revitalization, McPherson decided to make a frontal
assault on the vested interests of middle managers who, he thought, stood to
lose most from the changes he was proposing. In a kind of organizational
"pincers movement," he and his top team formed an alliance with the
assembly-line workers in Dana's plants to apply pressure to managers and
supervisors in the middle. (McPherson: "You can't convince managers to
accept changes like the ones we wanted. You've got to use power.") As with
any political strategy, McPherson's was not without risk. ("I was almost
fired six times... that I know of.") Still, this type of political strategy
is often necessary when dealing with opponents who, because of self-interest

14 -

or legitimate disagreements, question the need for change.

Establishing a will to change is not a one-time proposition. For a
revitalization to be successful, the will to change must be reinforced again
and again by top management. Every revitalization leader we interviewed
emphasized how often he had talked about the need for change. And every one
of them saw avoiding complacency (i.e., sustaining the will to change) as his
biggest challenge for the future.

Vision of the Future

Creating a strong will to change, by itself, was not enough to motivate
a revitalization. It had to be coupled with a clear vision of how the
company could achieve superior performance. In every case, there was strong
evidence that a core group of managers shared a similar idea about what their
company would look like when it got wherever it was going. This vision was
brought to life in slogans and phrases that rang through executive suites and
employee cafeterias. CEOs described it to investment analysts and other
industry executives. Presidents gave speeches and presentations about it.
Reporters discussed it in national business periodicals. It leapt out from
the pages of annual reports. In the revitalizations we studied, simple,
compelling visions were pervasive.

The content of these visions was quite diverse. The core of
McPherson's vision for Dana Corporation was boosting productivity by
"treating workers like adults." As soon as he was named President, he
launched a "paperless people involvement" program by throwing out all the old
corporate policy manuals and substituting for them a two-page statement of
purpose and philosophy — McPherson's vision for Dana — stressed the

- 15 -

importance of face-to-face communication between managers and workers. Every
manager and supervisor had to encourage opinions and ideas from his people,
implement those that had merit, and explain why the others could not be
used. 10

Harper's vision for ConAgra was very different: to become "#1" — the
best-earning food company in the U.S. Later, this vision was refined to
emphasize maximizing shareholder wealth by sustaining a high return on common
equity in all of its businesses. While the goal of maximizing shareholder
wealth sounds abstract. Harper's concern for ConAgra's shareholders was quite
concrete. Two weeks before joining the company, he attended a tense annual
meeting and was cornered by two short grey-haired ladies from western
Nebraska who had driven all night to come to the meeting. Dividends from
ConAgra's stock were their only source of income, and they wanted to know
when the company was going to start paying dividends again. ("Those two
ladies had an impact on this company.")

While the content of the visions varied, they shared several common
features :

- They were wholistic, integrating strategic, cultural, and operating
elements .

- They were simple and down to earth, easily summarized in plain
language .

- They were compelling and evocative, capable of appealing to people's
hearts as well as their minds.

- While they emphasized new directions, they tried to reconcile the new
with the old.

The revitalization visions generally addressed broad strategic issues:

what customers to serve, what products or services to offer, what core skills

were needed to succeed in the business (Ansoff, 1965). For example. Harper's

strategic vision for ConAgra was to remain committed to "basic foods"

(commodities and basic packaged foods), to grow these core businesses through

internal development and acquisition, and to become low-cost producer in all

- 16 -

of them. Harper, who had run Pillsbury's chicken business, knew that
cyclical businesses like chicken farming could be profitable over the long
run. Thus, despite advice to the contrary from a group of investment
analysts who wanted ConAgra to generate "stair-step earnings," Harper and his
colleagues decided that the company could live with cyclicality if they could
realize high trend-line profits through the cycles. (Harper: "This company
is not going to be run by Wall Street!") In line with this vision, ConAgra's
financial goals emphasize a multi-year perspective — more than 20% return on
equity and more than 14% per year trend line earnings growth.

In addition to dealing broadly with strategic issues, revitalization
visions also identified a core set of values which characterized the new
thrust. Teamwork, increased responsibility for results, greater autonomy for
people and groups far from the top, and careful planning were core values for
many of these visions. Slogans were used to capture and communicate these
values. "No stair-step earnings," "Productivity through people," "Leadership
begins at the top," and similar slogans conveyed strong, clear meanings to
managers and workers alike. In fact, one of Dearden's maxims, "Leadership
begins at the top," was repeated by several of the managers we interviewed at
Hershey, suggesting that it was well integrated into the culture of the
company. Slogans were also important at ConAgra. During one negotiating
session for the acquisition of Armour Food from Greyhound, ConAgra's managers
repeated the company's 20% return-on-common-equity goal so often that
Greyhound's CEO accused Harper of "having it tattooed on their shorts."

In many cases, these values were not really new: they recast
traditional values in a new light. Harper's emphasis on low cost production
reinforced a tradition of cost leadership which Harper's predecessor, Allan
Mactier, introduced to the company in the 1960s. When Bill Dearden became

- 17 -

CEO of Hershey Foods, he resurrected many of Milton Hershey's personal
sayings and used them in his own speeches. He even moved Hershey's corporate
headquarters back into Milton Hershey's old home, which had been used as an
executive country club since Hershey's death.

Most visions began as highly personal expressions of the individuals
leading the revitalizations. Mike Harper wrote a "white paper" which became
the first draft of ConAgra's new "philosophy." Rene McPherson created Dana's
one-page statement of corporate goals and policies. Bill Dearden wrote down
his own "personal credo" and published it as part of Hershey's corporate
policy manual. Why did these leaders feel confident enough in their personal
values to impose them on their companies? For one thing, in most cases they
had already tested out their visions in other operations they had managed
before. McPherson of Dana pilot-tested many of the people-oriented
management techniques he introduced as Dana's president when he was general
manager of the company's Spicer Division. Dearden of Hershey stressed
planning and marketing throughout the eighteen years he spent in sales and
general management at the chocolate company. Harper of ConAgra tested and
refined his managerial philosophy at Pillsbury as he rose to senior levels at
that company. Carlzon of SAS tried out many elements of his management
approach when he directed Linjeflyg, the Swedish domestic carrier.

The revitalization visions were syndicated early on with other top
managers. Off-site retreats were used to clarify the vision and develop
commitment to it. At Emerson Electric, Persons held his first planning
conference in 1955 on an ore boat moored in the middle of the Mississippi
River. At ConAgra, Harper convened a meeting of seven key board members and
managers at Vail (a ski resort in Colorado) to decide what should be done
with the company. According to Harper, this three-day meeting was "the most

- 18 -

important event in the history of this company." As with establishing the
collective will to change, the purpose of these meetings was to generate
active commitment to the vision, not just passive support. •'•^

Once top management was committed to the vision, extensive personal
travel, appearances at group gatherings, and review processes were used to
communicate it throughout the company. A climate of openness was created,
where seniors managers made themselves accessible to subordinates and openly
invited their ideas and comments. In the early days of SAS's revitalization,
Carlzon spent a great deal of time flying around on SAS flights delivering
sermons on customer relations to flight attendants, pilots, baggage handlers,
ground agents, and anyone else who would listen. ("Customer relations are
first, second, and third in importance around here." "We've got to be one
percent better in a hundred details, not one hundred percent better in
one.") When Sumitomo Bank sent its Tokyo branch head, Tsutomu Murai, and
four other executives to turn Toyo Kogyo around in 1974, Murai tried to
replace an authoritarian, top-down tradition with "an atmosphere of
openness. "^^

ConAgra used a different approach to develop commitment to a new
vision. After Harper drafted his "white paper" laying out his corporate
philosophy for ConAgra, he initiated an elaborate review process for the
philosophy. Most managers and many non-managerial employees were asked to
meet in small groups to review the statement and add points they felt were
missing. Sitting together in small discussion groups, employees would argue
over the wording of a sentence for hours. This process, which one executive
called "a tedious, time-consuming process of debating trivia," took several
months to complete. Once the philosophy was debated, signed off, and
published, though, it was accepted and "owned" by most of the key people in

- 19 -

the company. (Harper: "It was a team-building process. We were building our
vocabulary. Then the dam broke, and it went like a flash.")

What did visions accomplish for these companies? Arguably, their most
important function may have been to demonstrate and reinforce management's
commitment to charting a new course for the company. When people make
voluntary, public statements of support for a course of action, they are
likely to become more committed to that action. ^-^ Thus, managers who go on
record promoting a new vision grow more committed to it. Since senior
managers' commitment is critical to success in a revitalization, this
commitment-building function is a crucial one.

Visions also helped define action arenas for organization members.
They helped people identify and champion actions that could help move the
revitalizations forward. To do this, the vision could not be too detailed:
it had to be broad enough to let people express their own ideas and
enthusiasms within it. On the other hand, in order to have impact, the
vision had to be interpretable in cbncrete terms as well. This was
accomplished by linking the visions with new planning systems.

New (or radically reworked) business planning processes were
established almost immediately in all the revitalized companies. At ConAgra
and Hershey, divisions' new strategic plans were forbidden to contain any
financial numbers at first. In Harper's words, they were supposed to discuss
"dreams and schemes," to get ConAgra's managers to "think strategically."
Managers were asked to address questions like "Where do you see the business
going?" and "What kind of capital is required?" Strategic planning processes
like ConAgra's and Hershey's were not designed to provide more detailed
information to corporate policy-makers so that they could make better
centralized decisions. They were intended to force operating managers to

20

understand their businesses better and commit to targets and goals they felt
they could achieve. Over two or three years, planning meetings evolved from
mechanical presentations to organic strategic conversations between business
units and corporate headquarters.

Visions also gave employees a sense of stability to counteract the
major changes they were being asked to make in their everyday routines. A
concrete, compelling vision of the future can help people unfreeze prior
attitudes and commitments and start thinking and acting in new ways. It can
help develop a collective sense of "system readiness" — a willingness to
live with the anxiety of anticipated uncertainty.^^

Finally, visions helped set appropriate expectations for outside
constituencies. For example, several managers mentioned the usefulness of a
clear vision in communicating with the investment community.

Chappioniag Leadership

A strong will to change coupled with a compelling vision of the future
are two essential elements for a successful revitalization. But the
companies in our sample weren't revitalized by brilliant strategic visions or
hard-driving CEOs. Success came from the combined efforts of many people
focusing on the business fundamentals and doing lots of little things very
well. It took a special kind of leadership — "championing leadership" —
and a multitude of "momentum-building activities" to make this happen, and
where they weren't present, nothing much changed.

In the case of AM International, Ash and his top team communicated a
strong will to change from the time they came on board. (Replacing almost
80% of the company's senior managers with outsiders certainly helped

- 21 -

reinforce the need for change.) While Ash's vision for the company may have
been overambitious, few observers have faulted its general direction.
Furthermore, Ash and his top team communicated the vision aggressively and
with a good deal of sophistication. The failure of Ash and his team to
revitalize AM International came from an inability to couple their will to
change and their vision of the future with concrete actions that could be
initiated and implemented by lower level managers and workers. Ash and his
team failed to develop championing leadership down the line, and, as a
result, generated too few demonstrable successes that could show a path and
build credibility in the vision. In the words of Richard Black, who replaced
Ash as CEO, " . . . [M]anagement was not in touch with reality. It was like a
Walter Mitty adventure."^-* In sum, AM International's failure was not a
failure of will or strategy, but one of implementation and execution.

Champions are advocates who fight persistently for their ideas. The
key role champions play in spurring the development of new products and
processes inside organizations has been recognized at least since the early
1960s, when Don Schon discussed the importance of champions for innovation in
a classic Harvard Business Review article. " The idea that champions are
important outside the realm of new product and process development is rather
new. Peters and Waterman discuss the important role champions play in
generating innovation in their sample of "excellent companies."^' Kanter
has described "change masters" in a way that suggests champions: individuals
with enough focus and drive to get new projects started and finished, despite
resistance from superiors, peers, and subordinates, and the conservatism
inherent in most organizations.^" Because this concept is somewhat broader
than the original concept of product champions, we call it "championing
leadership."

- 22 -

The revitalizat ion leaders provided the most prominent examples of
championing leadership: McPherson at Dana, Dearden at Hershey, Charpie at
Cabot, Persons at Emerson, Harper at ConAgra, Carlzon at SAS .... The list
goes on and on. These revitalization leaders were more than "change
agents." They were people working to reshape the fundamental character of
their companies. As a result, these revitalization leaders were more
ideological than their business-as-usual counterparts. They knew they had to
reshape how employees thought about their own roles and responsibilities if
they were going to affect the company in any lasting way. Thus, they
approached their roles with dramatic flair, aware that their actions had to
be "larger than life" if they were going to have an impact on many others.
Rather than manage by exception, they managed by symbols, often attending to
apparently mundane details which then became symbols of their goals and
priorities .

A fascinating example of this symbolism was captured in an anecdote
mentioned in three different interviews at ConAgra. Whenever Mike Harper
discusses ConAgra's financial performance (e.g., during negotiations for an
acquisition candidate, in conversations with key executives whom he's trying
to induce to join the company, in discussions with outsiders), he begins by
opening the company's annual report ceremonially to pages 4 and 5, where the
firm's financial objectives and results have been printed consistently since
1977. For ConAgra's managers, this ritual has come to symbolize the
importance of considering every decision in light of the growth and
profitability targets established in 1976 and achieved every year since then.

Revitalization leaders were willing to face conflict, to use their
power to deal with others who were unwilling or incapable of change. Because
of this, all the revitalizations had some casualties. The head of an

- 23 -

acquired company was deemed incapable of leading his operation in a new
direction, and he was let go. A sales force built around an old-boy network
of salesmen promoted solely on the basis of seniority was transformed into a
young, aggressive sales and marketing organization over several years by a
series of early retirements and outplacements . On the other hand, there was
surprisingly little talk of "house-cleanings" or "blood baths." With rare
exceptions, revitalization leaders persuaded and cajoled managers already in
place to contribute their efforts to the new thrust.

Conventional accounts of turnarounds emphasize the role of the leader
(or "turnaround artist") as decision-maker and architect of the change. Like
turnaround artists, revitalization leaders made decisions and planned new
structures. This highly visible activity of the revitalization leader,
however, was only a small part of the championing leadership evident in these
revitalizations . Most of the change in these companies was not driven down
from the top; it bubbled up from the bottom. Individuals at many levels who
accepted the need for change and believed in the vision signed on as
champions in their own operations, sought out ways they could contribute to
the overall effort, and often made substantial progress in changing the way
things worked. By personal example, the revitalization leaders modeled
championing leadership for potential champions way down in their
organizations. Their own activism legitimated an activist style down the
line. Since the ultimate success of every revitalization depended on the
efforts of people throughout the company to get new programs going, this may
have been more crucial than all the decisions and plans the leaders made on
their own.

Championing leadership was evident at the division manager level at
Hershey Foods. When Bill Dearden took over as CEO of Hershey Foods in 1976,

- 24

he asked Earl Spangler, president of the chocolate company, and Joe Viviano,
president of the pasta division, to develop new strategic plans for building
their businesses. According to Spangler, "we buckled ourselves into some
hotel seats for a few days" to come up with a plan. Viviano started meeting
with his staff on Saturdays and Sundays at the pasta plant to plot a growth
strategy. ("We had the heat shut off on week-ends to cut costs, so we worked
in parkas and gloves. I remember writing 'We want to be #1' on the board at
that first meeting, and everybody laughed.") By 1981, sales in Hershey's
chocolate business had grown to over $1 billion, a target that Spangler and
his staff had originally set for 1985, and operating margins and return on
capital both exceeded profitability objectives. By 1985, Hershey's pasta
sales were ten times what they had been in 1975, and with the acquisition of
Pillsbury's American Beauty division in 1984, the company overtook the
Mueller division of CPC International to become the largest pasta
manufacturer in the U.S.

Spangler and Viviano are prototypes of the championing leaders who are
crucial to revitalizing a large company. Both grew up in their businesses
and understood them from the bottom up. Both set clear goals that were
consistent with the overall vision Dearden had for Kershey. Both relied on
their subordinates to generate growth, just as Dearden relied on them. Both
were given enough autonomy to get things done, subject to the expectation
that "You do what you say you're going to do," and they did the same for
their people. And both were rewarded for their efforts. A new incentive
plan gave them bonuses every year their operating income exceeded the
previous year's and achieved at least 90% of plan. With several trigger
points, this plan could pay off generously for managers like Spangler and
Viviano who grew their businesses at a rapid clip.

- 25

Finding and motivating champions is a key responsibility for top
managers in a revitalization. The place to look for champions varies
somewhat depending on the revitalization's vision. Given McPherson's vision
for Dana, blue-collar workers were obvious sources of new ideas and
initiatives, and many of his actions were intended to empower champions to
rise up from the factory floor. But champions can come from almost
anywhere. Anyone who has thought about his or her work long enough to come
up with a list of possible improvements is a potential revitalization
champion. Sales can be an especially fertile source of champions. Sales
personnel are always rubbing up against customer problems, and these problems
are quite likely to reflect real opportunities for improving the company's
operations. Furthermore, championing leadership requires many of the same
skills as selling (e.g., communication, sensitivity to interpersonal cues,
enthusiasm). As director and later vice president of sales and marketing for
the Hershey Chocolate Company in the late 1960s, Dearden personally hired a
cadre of young marketing-oriented MBAs and then sent them out to spend a year
or more as sales representatives, calling on the trade. When they returned
from the field, they were well-equipped to champion a new marketing vision
for the company.

The single most important action which top management took to encourage
champions in all the revitalizations we studied was decentralizing their
operations and granting more autonomy to people lower down in their
organizations. Fokker's revitalization was launched when it spun off from a
Dutch-German joint venture (VFW) in 1977. This "demerger" gave control over
product development and sales back to Swarttouw and his management group,
enabling them to begin designing and building a successor to Fokker's
remarkably successful F27.^^ At Hershey, decentralization was accomplished

26 -

by establishing product divisions. At Cabot, where all the important
functions reported directly to a single Executive Vice President, a product
group structure was inserted between the corporate office and the divisions
and departments. This structural change allowed each business to be
evaluated and treated independently and debureaucratized decision-making
considerably. ConAgra chose to emphasize their division managers'
independence and autonomy — as well as their responsibility and
accountability — by renaming its divisions "Independent Operating Companies"
and changing their titles to "President." Besides increasing the involvement
and commitment of lower-level managers, decentralizing these large companies
into self-contained business units increased the number of general managers
who interfaced directly with customers in the outside world. Revitalized
companies thus became more oriented to their external environments — i.e.,
"closer to their customers.".^"

At Dana, autonomy was pushed down below the plant level by an
organizing device called the "store manager" concept. Each department or
shop in every Dana plant was considered a quasi-independent "store," and the
head of the shop was designated its "store manager." Store managers were
responsible for managing all facets of their stores, including production
planning, inventory control, quality assurance, reporting, and, ultimately,
controllable financial results. The store manager concept was intended to
break, up a monolithic factory into manageable pieces. It achieved this by
reinforcing the same values of autonomy, responsibility, and discipline that
McPherson expected from everyone who worked at Dana.

Besides setting up organizational structures and management systems to
encourage champions, top management supported them in other ways as well. In
general, senior managers tried to create an entrepreneurial climate that gave

-li-

as many people as possible an opportunity to get involved and become
champions. On the other hand, champions were not coddled. Top management
had high expectations for champions, and they encouraged them to set and
achieve aggressive — but realistic — targets. They also set the stage for
champions to compete with each other. When Charpie arrived at Cabot, he
decided that he had to generate some spirit among the company's younger
managers. ("There were no hungry, clamoring, aggressive young managers who
wanted to be President.") He established a new incentive plan to pay big
bonuses for performance. He also expanded the distribution list for
divisional budget reports to over 50 people to let them compare their own
performance with their peers. At Dana, McPherson set up a closed circuit TV
system, dubbed the "Dana Today" show, where division and plant sales and
profits were updated daily and displayed for all managers (and many workers)
to see. ConAgra's emphasis on independent operating companies encouraged
friendly competition between them, and Harper reinforced it by awarding
prizes to the top lOCs in several categories each year.

Momentum-Building Ac tivities

Besides a will to change, a vision of the future, and championing
leadership, the revitalized companies displayed a high volume and fast pace
of activities that built credibility and a sense of momentum in the
revitalization process. Later actions built on demonstrated successes
achieved early on.

In every revitalization, the first step was the same — finding a new
revitalization leader to spearhead the change effort. Although most
revitalizations did not involve great failures or crises, bringing in a new

28 -

face to establish a clear break with the past and symbolize the new vision
was clearly important. On the other hand, unlike turnarounds, insiders were
generally preferred over outsiders to lead the revitalizations . Only nine of
the twenty-two revitalization leaders listed in Table 1 were brought in from
the outside to take over. Other things equal, insiders have a number of
advantages over outsiders in orchestrating a revitalization. They understand
the organization's capabilities and values and thus have better knowledge of
what can and can't be done. They have already established relationships with
other members of the top team. Over the five or ten years that it takes to
revitalize a large company, these factors are often more important than the
additional credibility an outsider might have at the start. '^^

In a revitalization, it is essential to establish credibility quickly
so that new champions can be convinced to sign up and contribute. The best
way to do this is by achieving ' some "early wins" which convince people that
the program is real.^'^ In a study of turnarounds in India, Khandwalla
found that turnaround leaders searched for "quick pay-off actions" to help
them "establish credibility as quickly as possible in order to create enough
suspension of disbelief that makes mobilization of the organization for
turnaround possible." Making demonstrable improvements in product quality,
increasing capacity utilization, and securing large orders were some of the
early wins which Khandwalla's leaders used to build credibility and
momentum. ^^

The newly appointed revitalization leaders started trying to build
credibility as soon as they took over. Most initiated a large number of
projects and programs, reminiscent of the "first 100 days" of Franklin D.
Roosevelt's New Deal. For example, in the first year of his presidency at
Dana, McPherson:

- 29

- Launched the "paperless people involvement" program

- Began throwing out time clocks, bells, and whistles from Dana's plants

- Started holding "town meetings" in the plants

- Began implementing the "store manager" concept

- Selected a simple productivity index for all Dana's operations (sales
per employee) and began publicizing it throughout the company.

- Established an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)

- Adopted the Scanlon Plan as a productivity experiment in one small
plant.

Similarly, in his first year as managing director at SAS , Jan Carlzon:

- Developed a new "Euroclass" marketing strategy to appeal to European
business travelers

- Began reconfiguring SAS aircraft to create separate business class
sections

- Installed a terminal in his office to monitor the punctuality of
flight departures

- Commissioned over 150 project study groups to cut costs and
rationalize information flow throughout the airline

- Began implementing the first of these study groups' recommendations —
moving head office staff "out front" to interact with customers

- Published a pamphlet called "Let's Get In There And Fight," aimed at
building enthusiasm for the revitalization

- Began holding staff parties in aircraft hangars.

This pattern of activities — a "fast break" that relied on many initiatives
to break old routines and get the revitalization going — was common to most
of the cases we studied. ^^

Of course, the fast break strategy has one obvious drawback. If some
of the efforts do not produce results, credibility will be weakened rather
than strengthened. Therefore, it was important to demonstrate that some of
the new programs could produce results. (On the other hand, it wasn't
necessary for all the programs to be successful; to a degree the diversity of
activities allowed some fallout to be forgiven.)

While a fast break can be powerful at the start, it cannot sustain
momentum over the five or ten years needed to revitalize a large company.
Time is a great enemy of any revitalization. The impact of specific programs
on peoples' attention dissipates over a time period much shorter than that
required for the revitalization to take hold. Furthermore, the longer a

- 30 -

revitalization takes, the more opportunity there is for other priorities to
creep in and sidetrack the process. External conditions can improve
temporarily, undermining the will to change. The performance of older,
outdated parts of the business can improve under the threat of major change,
so that they are no longer so obviously outdated. And, of course, new
initiatives can fail, reducing credibility in the entire effort. The natural
progression of activity and decision-making from the top down to lower levels
in the organization also poses a problem. Even if considerable progress is
being made, it becomes less visible to the entire organization and thus less
able to build momentum as time goes on.

To counter the effects of time, the revitalized companies kept up a
rapid pace of activity on multiple fronts at once which might be called
(borrowing again from basketball) a "full court press." By adopting a full
court press, a revitalization leader makes organized opposition much more
difficult. While a single program or initiative can be resisted with a fair
chance of success, multiple initiatives on a broad front can paralyze
opponents. Furthermore, a full court press maximizes involvement in a
revitalization (as it does in basketball). Thus, it can build commitment to
the new vision quickly.

One particular activity that helped build momentum in most of the
revitalizations was an aggressive — but carefully controlled — program of
acquisitions. This was true even in companies like Dana that revitalized
their core businesses rather than trying to move into major new ones. Dana
made over thirty acquisitions during McPherson's tenure as President and
CEO. Hershey Foods, Cabot Corporation, and Harris Corporation all made
important acquisitions during their revitalizations. Acquisitions played a
major role in Emerson Electric 's growth during the Persons era (1954 to

- 31 -

1973), and Emerson has been a frequent acquirer under Chuck Knight. ConAgra
made over sixty acquisitions after Harper took over.

While the volume of acquisition activity was high, ConAgra and the
other revitalized companies were not trying to assemble financial holding
companies. (Harper: "You're damn right we're not a holding company!") These
were operating and strategic acquisitions, pursued in line with the
revitalization's new vision, not financial "asset plays." They complemented
existing product lines, exploited distribution networks, expanded economies
of scale. All of the acquisitions in all of the companies were friendly, and
writing a buy-out agreement that gave something to both sides was key to
making the deal. In almost all cases, managers in the acquired firms were
kept on to run their businesses. When Hershey was negotiating for Friendly
Stores, for example, Dearden declared, "If we don't get their management
team, I don't want the company at any price." Because most of the acquired
companies grew quickly under their new parents, most of the old managers are
now running much larger businesses than before they were acquired.

How did acquisitions help these revitalizations sustain momentum? For
one thing, they demonstrated that the new leadership could take decisive
action. In many cases, this contrasted sharply with the caretaker management
that had preceded their arrival. Acquisitions also gave lots of people the
opportunity to experience change, either directly, if they interacted with
the acquired company, or vicariously, if they didn't. They also taught
people that there were different ways of doing business, and thus they helped
fight the "NIH — Not Invented Here — syndrome". Several managers described
changes they had made in their own operations based on what they learned from
acquired firms.

But simply spending shareholders' assets buying up companies was not

- 32 -

enough to build momentum in a revitalization. Acquisitions had to be
demonstrable successes in their own right. When management showed it could
turn around an ailing acquiree and bring it back to a growth track (or
accelerate the growth of a healthy one), then more and more people began
believing in the revitalization and championing more and more projects which
contributed to its strength. One of ConAgra's acquisitions tripled its sales
in the five years after it was acquired, and the earnings of another one
(Banquet Foods) rose almost an order of magnitude. Such dramatic
improvements built credibility in ConAgra's revitalization.

In order to sustain momentum in a revitalization over five or ten
years, managers and workers must get some short-term satisfactions and
feelings of accomplishment from championing new projects that improve their
company's performance. Therefore, the revitalization process must be
punctuated by events that can provide reinforcement to organization members
over the short and medium-term. In the revitalizations we studied, this was
achieved partly through the normal processes of goal-setting and
results-checking. These annual or semi-annual rituals were supplemented,
however, by a wide variety of business and social events that helped build a
sense of excitement and enthusiasm in the process. In a sense, these events
helped people go beyond merely contributing to the revitalization and helped
them celebrate it as well.

Acquisitions were one way of adding excitement and a sense of
short-term accomplishment to help people celebrate the revitalizat ion's
success. Management workshops and group gatherings were another way of
celebrating. One delightful example was a two-day workshop held recently
with the senior managers of a prominent Eastern regional bank. A.fter a day
and a half of listening, discussing, arguing, eating, drinking, and golfing.

- 33 -

the eighty participants were scheduled to conclude the workshop with group
presentations and some final remarks by the bank's CEO. The finale was
anything but bankerly. Four groups of 20 bankers each marched onto the stage
wearing custom-designed, matching T-shirts. Two of the groups had composed
their own songs. (The other two stuck to chanting in unison.) One group had
made cardboard signs that spelled out a different slogan on each side. The
CEO gave his talk standing on an orange crate — his symbol for preaching the
bank's new gospel — and he started off by announcing that everyone would
find their own orange crates sitting in their offices on Monday. The
workshop concluded with an unusual awards ceremony: the CEO and Chairman of
the bank called nearly twenty people up front to paste gold foil stars on
their foreheads to recognize their contributions to the workshop.

Of course, celebrations like this help build momentum only if there is
something to celebrate. They must be linked with real victories on the
business battlefield or they quickly lose their power.

CONCLUSION

Planning and implementing a revitalization in a large organization is a
supremely challenging task. The revitalization framework and examples
discussed here are only a first step in developing a theory of how these
major organizational transformations evolve and what factors lead to their
success or failure. One important question needing clarification is how
revitalizations differ from other large-scale change efforts (turnarounds,
recoveries, etc.). A second fundamental question is whether all
revitalizations are fairly similar or whether there are different types that
should be broken out and studied separately. For instance, revitalizations

- 34 -

in which companies strengthened their core businesses before adding to them
(Hershey, ConAgra, Dana) may evolve differently from revitalizations in which
companies abandoned or diversified sharply away from their core businesses
(Harris, Cabot). This study has emphasized the similarities across many
revitalizations, but there were differences, too, and these need to be
understood more thoroughly.

Assuming the basic concept of revitalization is valid, many questions
about the process remain unanswered. Indeed, each of the four elements in
the framework presented here raises many questions to which there are few
clear answers. For example, what management actions are effective for
convincing people of the need for change in a large company? Who is likely
to spearhead a revitalization? Who is likely to lag? How are people
persuaded to change their own cultural assumptions with minimum anxiety? How
are visions developed? How are they communicated? Is the power of a vision
solely a function of the way it is communicated, or does content affect its
potency, too? If content is important, what values are likely to aid the
revitalization? V/hat values are likely to detract from it? What values are
peripheral? What causes lower level managers to champion their own projects
in a revitalization? How do these projects build momentum in the overall
revitalization? How common is the "fast break" pattern? The "full court
press?" Why do they work? How do people decide that a revitalization is
credible, rather than just another "program-of-the-month?"

Above all, this study begs many questions about the role of leadership
in managing major organizational transformations. James McGregor Burns, Noel
Tichy and David Ulrich, and others discuss "transforming" leadership, but
there is little research on the concrete behaviors of transforming
leaders. ^-^ Studies like this one offer a unique opportunity for studying

- 35 -

leadership behavior in the context of the transformations themselves. This
could shed light on some important questions which have perplexed scholars
for many years. For example, one key question regarding leaders is how much
of their influence is achieved and how much is ascribed. In other words, to
what extent is leadership an attributional phenomenon, as Pfeffer and others
have argued. 2" Examining the revitalization process in detail provides one
way to distinguish between ex ante behaviors and ex post attributions and
assess the contributions of both.

The style of leadership adopted by the revitalization leaders in the
companies studied here was value-shaping leadership in the best tradition of
Barnard, Selznick, and Burns. ^' These leaders were thoroughly grounded in
the basics of their businesses, yet they realized they had to transcend
tradition and instill new values in order to revitalize their companies. To
do this, they kept their messages simple and repeated them over and over
again. Bill Dearden of Hershey, for example, preached his message at
corporate staff meetings every Tuesday, at quarterly key managers' meetings
that were video-taped and shown throughout Hershey 's divisions and plants, at
presentations of divisions' three-year and annual plans, at all the sales
training classes in the company, at meetings with trade associations,
financial analysts, and so on.

Revitalization leaders like Dearden were people-oriented and
accessible. They gave subordinates more autonomy, but they also expected
more performance, too. Perhaps most important, these leaders inspired
enthusiasm (not just compliance) from everyone (not just their senior
managers). In this sense, they were certainly charismatic, although Weber's
notion of charisma seems too personal and mystical to describe them
accurately.^" In fact, aside from a fair share of good fortune, there was

36 -

little mystery in these revitalizations . Their success was due mainly to the
combined efforts of many people working hard toward a common goal over many
years — the apotheosis of formal organization. Unfortunately, such
concentrated bursts of organized energy seem to elude most large companies,
even when they need them most.

FOOTNOTES

1 References used for source material about AM International include:

"Addressograph Multigraph Had a Great Fall," Forbes (September 15, 1973):
88; "AM International: When Technology was not Enough," Business Week
(January 25, 1982): 62-68; Louis Kraar, "Roy Ash Is Having Fun at
Addressogrief-Multigrief ," Fortune 97 (February 27, 1978): 47-52; and
Brian S. Moskal, "Richard Black's Precarious Perch," Industry Week (March
8, 1982): 48-51.

In recent years, organizational researchers have begun developing some
descriptive theories of large-scale transformation and change. Burton
Clark described the transformation of Swarthmore college in the 1920s and
1930s from a local Quaker college to a highly selective, world-class
liberal arts college. Clark documented the process of building
Swarthmore's new "organizational saga" (its embodied legend or mission),
and his study identified a number of general principles of large-scale
change. (Burton Clark, The Distinctive College: Antioch. Reed, and
Swarthmore . Chicago: Aldine, 1970) More recently, Richard Beckhard and
Reuben Harris, James Brian Quinn, Rosabeth Kanter, Noel Tichy, and others
have developed some interesting theoretical ideas about how large
companies evolve over time. See, for example: Richard Beckhard and Reuben
T. Harris, Organizational Transitions: Managing Complex Change (Reading,
MA: Add is ion-Wesley, 1977); Rosabeth Moss Kanter, The Change Masters:
Innovations for Productivity in the American Corporation (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1983); James Brian Quinn, Strategies for Change: Logical
Incrementalism (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1980); John R. Kimberly
and Robert E. Quinn, eds., Managing Organizational Transitions (Homewood,
IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1984); and Noel M. Tichy, Managing Strategic Change:
Technical. Political, and Cultural Dynamics (New York: Wiley, 1983).

3 Strategies for building grounded theory are discussed extensively in
Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory
(Chicago: Aldine, 1967). A complete understanding of the factors
affecting the revitalizat ion process would require examining companies
like AM International which attempted revitalizations that were
unsuccessful, as well as the success stories studied here. Some prominent
failures of organizational development interventions are described in
Philip H. Mirvis and David N. Berg, eds.. Failures in Organization
Development and Change: Cases and Essays for Learning (New York: Wiley,
1977). The study of failed revitalizations is a necessary adjunct to this
research and is being pursued vigorously now. Nevertheless, at this early
stage, when systematic knowledge about transformations of any kind is so
fragmentary, identifying any general principles or relationships that
apply across different cases seems to be a worthwhile endeavor.

4 In a study of secondary source descriptions of 132 major transitions in 36
large companies. Miller and Friesen identified the "entrepreneurial
revitalizat ion" as one of nine "archetypes of organizational transition."
(Danny Miller and Peter Friesen, "Archetypes of Organizational
Transition," Administrative Science Quarterly 25, June, 1980: 268-299) In
an entrepreneurial revitalization,

...companies become more aggressive and innovative in dealing with
competitors and more imaginative in meeting the needs of customers...
Moreover, there is less aversion to taking risks, (p. 282)

In Miller and Friesen's analysis, entrepreneurial revitalizations were
characterized by high rationality, innovation, turbulence, heterogeneity,
and centralization (but also more delegation). They produced significant
performance improvements with relatively low risk. Miller and Friesen's
characterization seems similar to the revitalizations studied here.

Tichy and Ulrich use the term revitalization more broadly than it is used
here to refer to almost any type of major transformation of a large
organization. (Noel M. Tichy and David 0. Ulrich, "Revitalizing
Organizations: The Leadership Role," in J. R. Kimberly and R. E. Quinn,
eds.. Managing Organizational Transitions. Homewood , IL: Richard D. Irwin,
1984: 240-264) Allaire and Firsirotu use the term revitalization to
include less radical transformations than those discussed here. (Yvan
Allaire and Mihaela Firsirotu, "How to Implement Radical Strategies in
Large Organizations," Sloan Management Review 26, no. 3, Spring, 1985:
19-34).

5 Several authors have attempted to summarize the key elements of successful
turnarounds. Based on a study of nine public and private-sector
enterprises in India, Khandwalla developed a "tentative prescription" of
thirteen steps required for a successful turnaround. (Fradip N.
Khandwalla, "Strategy for Turning Around Complex Sick Organizations,"
Vikalpa 6, no. 3/4, 1981: 143-165) Bibeault analyzed questionnaire
results from a sample of 81 publicly traded companies which had severe
earnings declines followed by turnarounds. (Donald B. Bibeault, Corporate
Turnaround: How Managers Turn Losers into Winners. New York: McGraw-Hill,
1982) From these questionnaires, supplemented by interviews with CEOs
from a number of companies that were turned around, Bibeault developed a
stage model of the process and identified several keys to successful
turnarounds. His study emphasized making a clear break with the past and
following the principle that "Cash is King". Other empirical studies of
turnaround strategies include: D. G. Schendel, G. R. Patten, and J. Riggs,
"Corporate Turnaround Strategies: A Study of Profit Decline and Recovery,"
Journal of General Management 3, no. 3 (1976): 3-11; Charles W. Hofer,
"Turnaround Strategies," Journal of Business Strategy 1 (1980): 19-31;
Donald C. Hambrick and Steven M. Schecter, "Turnaround Strategies for
Mature Industrial-Product Business Units," Academy of Management Journal
26, no. 2 (1983): 231-248; and Raymond A. Thietart, "Turnaround Strategies
for Businesses as a Function of Their Competitive Characteristics,"
(Unpublished working paper, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, October, 1984).

For the non-financial U.S. corporations, financial data was obtained from
Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT tapes, and stock price data was obtained from
the University of Chicago's Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
tapes. Forbes 's "Annual Report on American Industry" was used to provide
relative rankings of companies in their primary industries. For financial
institutions like Geico (insurance). First Boston, and Texas Commerce
Bank, performance indicators appropriate for financial institutions were
used, instead. Financial information for non-U. S. companies is more
limited, and less stringent tests were used.

7 Kanter, The Change Masters, p. 281

8 While ConAgra was still trying to dig itself out of its difficulties in
1974, Harper convinced the company's Board of Directors to approve an
unusual stock purchase plan for its top officers. These executives were
loaned money by the corporation at market rates to exercise immediate
options on ConAgra common stock. If the company turned around and its
stock price rose, these executives stood to gain. On the other hand, if
the stock price fell, they would still be personally liable to ConAgra for
the fixed amount of their notes. Obviously, this arrangement, while it
was generous, put the recipients at some personal risk. Seven of the
eight elibible officers believed in ConAgra's future enough to purchase
stock under the plan, and, as Table 2 indicates, their investment was

quite profitable.

9 When General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler began trying to convince the

United Auto Workers in the late 1970s that business as usual was no longer
enough, the adversarial relationship between management and labor
institutionalized over the years in the auto industry required dramatic
moves to cut through the barriers and develop a shared sense of
responsibility. Nothing communicated the need for change more
dramatically than the large financial losses reported by the major auto
manufacturers during the 1978-82 period. One senior GM executive admitted
that GM's announcement of a $762 million loss in 1980, its first since
1921, had done more to convince the UAW of the need for change than a
decade of management-labor conferences.

10 An excellent description of Dana's "paperless people involvement" program
is contained in Charles H. Gibson, "Paperless People Involvement —
Management Philosophy," S.A.M. Advanced Management Journal (Summer, 1975);
4-11.

11 Barrett and Cammann capture the spirit of this commitment in their

description of an offsite meeting held by National Steel Corporation's
senior managers to agree on a mission for that company:

After a final review of each element of the [mission] statement .. .the
group spent considerable time discussing what this mission statement
really meant to the organization and to each member of senior
management. Several people underscored the importance of commitment,
both by each individual and by the group as a whole, if the mission was
to be meaningful. (A. Lee Barrett, Jr. and Cortlandt Cammann,
"Transitioning to Change: Lessons from NSC," in J. R. Kimberly and R. E.
Quinn, eds.. Managing Organizational Transitions. Homewood , XL: Richard
D. Irwin, 1984: 223-224.)

12 A fascinating account of Toyo Kogyo's revitalization is contained in
Pascale, Richard J. and Thomas P. Rohlen. "The Mazda Turnaround." Journal
of Japanese Studies 9, no. 2 (1983): 219-263. Murai explained his
management philosophy to Pascale and Rohlen this way:

I wanted to have Toyo Kogyo employees understand my personality and
create an atmosphere of openness. For example, I looked for
opportunities to drink with younger people and when I had time, I looked
up union officials out on the shop floor and joined them in a cup of
coffee... I spent almost no time by myself at Toyo Kogyo. If there was
any extra time, I went out to union offices. My secretary worked on the
principle of scheduling as many meetings as possible .. .In two years, I
met every manager personally and with at least 2000 of our hourly
employees, (p. 234)

13 The relationship between attitudes and behavior has been a central topic
in social psychology for many years. In the past few years, psychologists
and organizational researchers have identified many situations where the
influence of behavior on attitudes is as strong or stronger than the
influence of attitudes on behavior. The dynamics of these "behavioral
commitment effects" are demonstrated and discussed in two provocative
articles: Barry M. Staw, "Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of
Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action." Organizat ional
Behavior and Human Performance 16 (1976): 27-44; and Gerald R. Salancik,
"Commitnjent is Too Easy!" Organizational Dynamics (Summer, 1977): 62-80.

14 The concept of "system readiness" was developed by Craig C. Lundberg in
"Strategies for Organizational Transitioning," in J. R. Kimberly and R. E.
Quinn, eds.. Managing Organizational Transitions (Homewood, IL : Richard D.
Irwin, 1984): 60-84. Ed Schein describes the need for psychological
safety in turnaround situations in Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture
and Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985): p. 295.

15 "AM International: When Technology was not Enough," Business Week, p. 62.

16 Donald A. Schon, "Champions for Radical New Inventions," Harvard Business
Review 41 , no. 2 (March/April, 1963): 77-86.

17 Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., In Search of Excellence:

Lftssons from America's Best-Run Companies (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).

18 Kanter, The Change Masters, op. cit.

19 Theo Van Oers and C. Buitenhuis, "Revitalization of Enterprises" (Lecture
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Strategic Management Society,
Philadelphia, October, 1984).

20 Peters and Waterman, In Search of Excellence, op. cit.

21 Most large companies have talented managers in out-of-the-way locations
who might be considered for leading a revitalization. When NCR
Corporation's Board of Directors realized the company had to transform
itself from an electromechanical adding machine manufacturer into an
electronic computer systems supplier, they brought Bill Anderson back from
NCR Japan, and promoted him up through several levels to Chief Operating
Officer. Since Anderson was an insider, he knew how the company worked
and could get things done efficiently. Since he was new to NCR's
corporate offices, he wasn't tainted with the failures of the past. Since
he had been competing successfully in NCR's most advanced markets, he
could champion a vision to help NCR compete in its new environment.

22 The value of "small wins" in building credibility is discussed in general
terms in Thomas J. Peters, "Symbols, Patterns, and Settings: An Optimistic
Case for Getting Things Done," Organizational Dynamics (Autumn, 1978). A
more detailed study of this phenomenon can be found in Thomas J. Peters,
"Patterns of Winning and Losing: Effects on Approach and Avoidance by
Friends and Enemies" (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University Graduate
School of Business, 1979).

23 Khandwalla, "Strategy for Turning Around Complex Sick Organizations,"
op. cit .

24 One exception was Toyo Kogyo, where changes were introduced more slowly,
partly because the company's old chairman remained in his official post
for several years after Murai took over the company for Sumitomo bank.
(Pascale and Rohlen, "The Mazda Turnaround," op. cit.)

25 Writers and researchers who have discussed transforming leadership
include: James McGregor Burns, Lpadprship (New York: Harper & Row, 1978);
Noel M. Tichy and David 0. Ulrich, "The Leadership Challenge: A Call for
the Transformational Leader," Sloan Managempn t: Review 26, no.l (Fall,
1984): 59-68; Bernard M. Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond
Expectations (New York: Free Press, 1985); and Nancy Roberts,
"Transforming Leadership: Sources, Process, Consequences" (Paper presented
at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Boston, August, 1984).

26 A number of writers have been associated with the idea that leadership is
ascribed or attributed, rather than achieved, including: Jeffrey Pfeffer,
"The Ambiguity of Leadership," Academy of Management Review 2 (January,
1977): 104-112; James R. Meindl, Sanford B. Ehrlich, and Janet M.
Dukerich, "The Romance of Leadership," Administrative Science Quarterly 30
(1985): 78-102; and Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace ^ trans. Rosemary Edmonds
(Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1969).

27 Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1938); Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957); and Burns, Leadership .
op. cit .

28 Max Weber, "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule," trans. Hans Gerth, in A.
Etzioni, ed . , A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations. 2nd ed . (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969): 6-15.

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